VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADVISORY COUNCIL COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

AO-10-26

July 28, 2026

Tyler K. Stanislawski
Request received via email

The staff of the Freedom of Information Advisory Council is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your email of August 18, 2025.

Dear Mr. Stanislawski:

You have submitted a request for an advisory opinion regarding the manner in which the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office handled your Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et seq. of the Code of Virginia) (FOIA) request for your complete personnel file. Specifically, whether the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office has properly applied subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia and whether the withheld internal communications and personnel records related to your termination for alleged improper conduct should be disclosed under FOIA.

Background Information

In your request for an advisory opinion, you attached your original FOIA request sent to the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office requesting “a complete copy of [your] personnel file and all related records maintained by the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office for the duration of [your] employment from 2021 through [your] termination on January 8, 2024.” Specifically, you requested your “full personnel file (employment application, training records, evaluations, commendations, disciplinary actions, and other related records).” You also requested “[a]ll documents, reports, memos, or communications relating to [your] termination, including the reasons and any investigation materials.” You further requested “[a]ny correspondence (letters, emails, or internal notes) that reference the decision to terminate [your] employment.” Lastly, you provided copies of communications between you and the FOIA Officer for the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office related to your request.

You stated that the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office provided “portions of [your] personnel file, including employment application, evaluations, commendations, and separation/termination paperwork.” However, the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office “withheld certain disciplinary records and internal communications” citing subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia as authority for withholding the requested records. You stated that you believe this exemption “was applied too broadly to withhold records that are directly related to [your] personnel and employment, rather than administrative investigations.”

You wrote that you are specifically “requesting disclosure of internal communications, including emails, memos, or notes, that directly discuss or affect the decision to terminate [your] employment” including “all internal paperwork pertaining to [your] disciplinary history for the entirety of [your] employment” with the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office. You also wrote, “Under Virginia FOIA and legal precedent, these records are generally considered disclosable [sic] unless specifically exempt.” You referenced the case Preston v. City of Virginia Beach.¹ In that matter, you wrote that the Supreme Court of Virginia “held that personnel records affecting employment decisions, including disciplinary actions and termination, are not automatically exempt from disclosure simply because they involve internal agency communications.” You further wrote that the Supreme Court of Virginia “emphasized that once a personnel decision has been made, records directly related to that decision—such as investigative reports, internal discussions, and supporting documentation—must be disclosed if they pertain to actions affecting the individual employee.” You stated, “In my case, the withheld internal communications directly relate to the decision to terminate my employment and therefore fall squarely within the type of personnel records the Court recognized as generally subject to disclosure.” Finally, you wrote, “Despite my requests for clarification and confirmation of the finality of their response, the agency has maintained that these records will not be released.”

FOIA Policy

FOIA policy in subsection B of § 2.2-3700 of the Code of Virginia ensures the people of the Commonwealth “ready access to public records in the custody of a public body or its officers and employees.” FOIA policy also provides that the “affairs of government are not intended to be conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy since at all times the public is to be the beneficiary of any action taken at any level of government.” Therefore, “all public records shall be available for inspection and copying upon request” unless a public body or its officers or employees specifically elect to exercise an exemption provided by FOIA or any other statute. FOIA policy further states, “All public records and meetings shall be presumed open, unless an exemption is properly invoked.”

FOIA Personnel and Law-Enforcement Exemptions

Subsection D of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia, in related part, states:

Access to personnel records of persons employed by a public body engaged in emergency medical services or fire protection services, a law-enforcement agency, or an emergency 911 system or any other equivalent reporting system shall be governed by the provisions of subdivision B 9 and subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1, as applicable. [Emphasis added].

Subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia provides the custodian with discretion, except where such disclosure is prohibited by law, to disclose:

Records of (i) background investigations of applicants for law-enforcement agency employment, (ii) administrative investigations relating to allegations of wrongdoing by employees of a law-enforcement agency, and (iii) other administrative investigations conducted by law-enforcement agencies that are made confidential by law. [Emphasis added].

Subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia exempts personnel information from mandatory disclosure and provides the custodian with discretion, except where such disclosure is prohibited by law, to disclose personnel information concerning identifiable individuals. However, subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia also provides that “access shall not be denied to the person who is the subject thereof.” Additionally, subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia further provides in related part, that public access to “records of the name, position, job classification, official salary, or rate of pay of, and records of the allowances or reimbursements for expenses paid to, any officer, official, or employee of a public body” shall not be denied unless the public employee’s annual salary or rate of pay is $10,000 or less. FOIA allows the custodian to withhold personnel information from disclosure except for the information specifically required to be disclosed, but prohibits the custodian from withholding personnel information from a requester seeking to obtain his or her own personnel information. Thus, from the information you provided, the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office may have reasonably denied your request under FOIA, but you may possess certain access rights pursuant to the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act (§ 2.2-3800 et seq. of the Code of Virginia) (Government Data Act).

Analysis

This office has issued prior advisory opinions on FOIA and the exemption for personnel information in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia. Specifically, in Advisory Opinion 06 (2024), this office considered whether FOIA granted access under subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia to personnel information including salary pay, overtime pay, bonus pay, and total compensation paid to sworn law-enforcement employees on the rosters of law-enforcement agencies. In that opinion, this office analyzed the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Hawkins v. Town of South Hill.² In Hawkins, the Supreme Court examined “the scope of the personnel information exemption” to FOIA in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia and attempted to “reconcile the competing interests of open access to public records and the privacy expectations of government employees.”³ The Supreme Court evaluated the plain meanings of “personnel information” and “personnel records” and determined “that the only content exempt from disclosure is that which is tied to the employment of the individual in some way, and which otherwise would not be disclosed to the employer.”⁴ The Supreme Court deliberated that the intent of FOIA was not “to exempt all employment information from the view of the public, but only that which is private.”⁵

The Supreme Court opined in Hawkins, for purposes of subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia, that “personnel information” means “data, facts, or statements within a public record relating to a specific government employee, which are in the possession of the entity solely because of the individual’s employment relationship with the entity, and are private, but for the individual’s employment with the entity.”⁶ Recognizing this office’s previous analysis of the issue, the Supreme Court determined that the definition for “‘personnel information’ exemption, like the ‘personnel record’ exemption before it, is a ‘privacy-based exemption, designed to protect the subject of the record from the dissemination of personal information.’”⁷ The Supreme Court distinguished “that data, facts, and statements are private if their disclosure would constitute an ‘unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ to a reasonable person under the circumstances.”⁸ The Supreme Court further expounded that “the ‘precise contours’ of what content qualifies as private are ‘neither rigid nor precise’ and require determination in the context of each case.”⁹ Therefore, applying the Supreme Court’s analysis to future FOIA requests, whether any particular record contains exempt personnel information must be determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the definition for “personnel information” and the test established by Hawkins.

In Advisory Opinion 06 (2024), this office also concluded that “FOIA affirmatively requires that ‘records of the name, position, job classification, official salary, or rate of pay of, and records of the allowances or reimbursements for expenses paid to, any officer, official, or employee of a public body’ be made available to the public.”¹⁰ However, “FOIA also authorizes withholding personnel information concerning identifiable individuals from release.”¹¹ Consequently, this office, utilizing the Supreme Court’s guidance in Hawkins, advised that the disclosure of personnel information must be evaluated in the context of whether it constitutes “‘an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ to a reasonable person under the circumstances.”¹²

In Harmon v. Ewing, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that “the general personnel records exemption found at subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 also applies to law-enforcement personnel records.”¹³ The custodian of law-enforcement records possesses discretion whether to invoke the exemptions provided in subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia and subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia. Unless the requester is seeking his or her own personnel information, the custodian may withhold personnel records of current and former law-enforcement employees pursuant to subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia, except for the information specifically identified for disclosure and in accordance with the Hawkins test previously discussed. However, subsection F of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia is a conflict resolution clause that provides that if there is a conflict between requests made under § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia and other provisions of law, then § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia shall control. Therefore, even if such records directly relate to the requester, the custodian may elect not to disclose those types of records specifically exempt under subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia.¹⁴

Previously published Advisory Opinion 09 (2008) addressed the exercise of discretion by the custodian. In that opinion, this office wrote, “FOIA shifts the burden to the public body to establish the exemption [in subdivision E of § 2.2-3713 of the Code of Virginia], but does not address any further challenge to the public body’s choice to exercise the exemption once it is established.”¹⁵ Additionally, this office stated, “FOIA itself does not contain such language, so there is no explicit statutory basis to challenge the custodian’s decision to withhold records when an exemption applies. That does not necessarily mean that you cannot bring such a challenge, only that the statute itself is silent.”¹⁶ This office ultimately concluded: “FOIA provides the custodian with the choice to withhold records, or to disclose records. Regardless of which action the custodian chooses, he has made a choice, and that choice is an exercise of the discretion granted under FOIA.”¹⁷

However, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia in the matter of Keil v. O’Sullivan may apply specifically to your inquiry.¹⁸ In Keil, the Supreme Court opined on whether Keil was entitled under FOIA and the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act § 2.2-3800 et seq. of the Code of Virginia) (Government Data Act) to an internal-affairs investigation file that resulted in his demotion.¹⁹ The Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office had conducted an internal-affairs investigation of a jailhouse incident involving an inmate that resulted in disciplinary actions against several deputies, including the demotion of supervising deputy Keil.²⁰ Subsequently, Keil made various requests under FOIA and the Government Data Act for his entire employment file, including documentary and video records files relating to the internal-affairs investigation, maintained by the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office.²¹ Keil had also requested documents pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, but the Supreme Court noted, “That statute, however, applies only to federal governmental agencies.”²²

The Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office produced Keil’s personnel file but denied his FOIA request for the internal-affairs records as exempt under subdivision B 4 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia (records related to “persons imprisoned in penal institutions”) and subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia (records related to “administrative investigations” of alleged wrongful conduct by law-enforcement officers).²³ Because of the denial, Keil filed suit in general district court against Sheriff O’Sullivan, in his official capacity, seeking the withheld records, but the district court ruled against Keil.²⁴ The Supreme Court remarked that for reasons not fully understood from the record below the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office “never specifically responded to Keil’s request for information under the Government Data Act.”²⁵

Next, Keil appealed to the circuit court seeking a de novo review of his request for all Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office records referencing him “regarding the internal investigation of [the] incident in the jail, including interviews and videotapes.”²⁶ “The circuit court rejected Keil’s [FOIA] claim because it sought records exempt from disclosure under subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia” and denied his requests under the Government Data Act because such records only can be obtained if the requester “is a ‘data subject’” under the Government Data Act.²⁷

Keil then appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals, which “affirmed the circuit court’s holding that the [Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office] did not violate [FOIA] by failing to separately respond to Keil’s overlapping pre-litigation requests.”²⁸ “The Court of Appeals also agreed with the circuit court that Keil was not a ‘data subject’ under the Government Data Act and thus had no statutory standing to request the internal-affairs records potentially implicating him.”²⁹ The Court of Appeals held “that Keil was not entitled to any relief under either [FOIA] or the [Government] Data Act.”³⁰

Subsequently, Keil appealed the matter to the Supreme Court of Virginia that found “no error” in the Court of Appeals’ FOIA ruling and agreed with the lower courts’ decisions that “Keil has no remedy under [FOIA].”³¹ However, limiting its review in Keil to the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the Government Data Act, the Supreme Court took a different view of Keil’s claim for records under the Government Data Act. The Supreme Court determined that the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office “violated the [Government Data] Act by refusing to provide Keil access to the internal-affairs records related to Keil’s challenged actions or inactions in his capacity as a supervising deputy sheriff.”³²

In its analysis, the Supreme Court evaluated Keil’s right of access to the internal-affairs records under the Government Data Act. Distinguishing the Government Data Act from other statutes that shield government information from the public, the Supreme Court stated that the Government Data Act “does not make [covered] personal information confidential but establishes certain practices which must be followed in the collection, retention, and dissemination of that information.”³³ The Supreme Court compared and contrasted its ruling in Hinderliter to the facts in this matter.³⁴ The Supreme Court acknowledged that over the last 50 years the Privacy Protection Act of 1976 as interpreted in Hinderliter had been amended on several occasions eventually being renamed the “Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act” in 2001.³⁵ The Supreme Court remarked that “[t]he current statute retains all of the previous provisions applicable in Hinderliter and includes newer provisions that further strengthen the policies articulated by the General Assembly a half century ago.”³⁶

The Supreme Court opined that the definition of “data subject” in the Government Data Act means “an individual about whom personal information is indexed or may be located under his name, personal number, or other identifiable particulars, in an information system” that “tracks word for word the definition in the original 1976 enactment that [the Supreme Court] interpreted in Hinderliter.”³⁷ Applying the Government Data Act’s definition of “personal information” to Keil’s case, the Supreme Court found that “personal information” means, among other things, “all information that (i) describes . . . anything about an individual including, but not limited to . . . [his] employment record, or (ii) affords a basis for inferring . . . things done by or to such individual.”³⁸ The Supreme Court observed that “[t]he capacious scope of this definition of ‘personal information’ covers the internal-affairs-investigation records in Keil’s case even more securely that [sic] the predecessor provision covered the internal-investigation report in Hinderliter.”³⁹

The Supreme Court also considered the context of digital and non-digital information systems and manners of indexing records.⁴⁰ The Supreme Court determined that the phrase “may be located” in the definition of “data subject” “implies no custom search methodology or specialized search terms.”⁴¹ The Supreme Court simply decreed that “[i]f a record can reasonably be found using this information, it should be found.”⁴²

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing Keil’s FOIA claims but reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the circuit court’s dismissal of Keil’s claims under the Government Data Act.⁴³ The Supreme Court remanded this matter back to the Court of Appeals “for further remand to the circuit court to review in camera the records withheld by the [Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office] to determine if anything in those records contains ‘personal information’ subject to Keil’s ‘[r]ights of data subjects’ under § 2.2-3806 [of the Code of Virginia].”⁴⁴The Supreme Court further directed that “[m]atters within those records that do not directly or indirectly contain ‘personal information,’ [as defined in] § 2.2-3801 [of the Code of Virginia], about Keil should be redacted by the circuit court prior to review or access by Keil.”⁴⁵ “With respect to any ancillary matters necessary to bring this case to closure,” the Supreme Court directed that “the circuit court retains authority to adjudicate them.” ⁴⁶

In several prior advisory opinions, this office addressed the interaction of FOIA’s provisions and the Government Data Act.⁴⁷ This office previously qualified its statutory authority as being limited to offer “opinions and guidance only in regard to FOIA” and that it “cannot offer independent interpretations and guidance regarding statutes outside of FOIA, but we do take note of such statutes as they interact with FOIA.”⁴⁸ This office has also recognized that instead of FOIA, a requester who is a “data subject” might be eligible to utilize the Government Data Act as an “alternative mechanism to access records.”⁴⁹ This office wrote that a “data subject” generally possesses “a right to access information gathered about him by an ‘agency,’” because “[s]ubdivision A 3 of § 2.2-3806 [of the Code of Virginia] gives a data subject the right to inspect all personal information maintained by a given agency, and be informed of the source of the information and the names of the recipients of this information.”⁵⁰

Moreover, in Advisory Opinion 03 (2005), regarding an inquiry “specifically about the interaction of FOIA and subsection B of § 2.2-3806 of the Government Data Act” this office wrote the following:

Next, addressing your question about subsection B of § 2.2-3806 of the [Government Data Act]: this provision does not prohibit the disclosure of any records under FOIA. While FOIA provides that access to records may be limited as otherwise specifically provided by law, subsection B of § 2.2-3806 contains no such limitation. In regard to letters of reference, subsection B of § 2.2-3806 states that [n]othing in [the Government Data Act] shall be construed to require an agency to disseminate any recommendation or letter of reference from or to a third party that is a part of the personnel file of any data subject. The [Government Data Act] thus does not require that an agency disclose any recommendation or letter of reference to the subject, nor does it prevent such disclosure. Subsection B must be interpreted in context with the rest of § 2.2-3806. Subsection A of § 2.2-3806 gives a data subject the right to inspect [a]ll personal information about that data subject except as provided in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1, subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.4, and subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.5. Thus subsection B of § 2.2-3806 refers to this right to inspect provided by subsection A of § 2.2-3806, clarifying that this right does not require an agency to disseminate to a data subject recommendations or letters of reference from or to third parties. The plain language used in subsection B of § 2.2-3806 limits its application to this chapter, meaning the [Government Data Act]. Because FOIA is a separate chapter within the Code, subsection B of § 2.2-3806 by its own terms of limitation does not apply to FOIA. Additionally, subsection A of § 2.2-3806 clearly references three provisions of FOIA, so it is apparent that the General Assembly considered FOIA in enacting the records access provisions of § 2.2-3806. If the General Assembly had meant for subsection B of § 2.2-3806 to limit access under FOIA, it would have used language appropriate to effectuate that intent. It did not do so. Thus, from the plain language and context of subsection B of § 2.2-3806, it is apparent that it refers to access rights granted under the [Government Data Act] and does not affect access rights granted by FOIA.⁵¹

However, in Advisory Opinion 04 (2016), this office eventually determined it necessary to temper expectations regarding its authority to discuss the Government Data Act in particular, by writing the following:

Unfortunately, because this office is limited to providing advisory opinions and guidance regarding FOIA, we cannot offer an advisory opinion on matters that fall outside of FOIA. Specifically, subdivision 1 of § 30-179 grants the FOIA Council the authority to “Furnish, upon request, advisory opinions or guidelines, and other appropriate information regarding [FOIA] to any person or agency of state or local government, in an expeditious manner.” We do consider other laws as they interact with FOIA, particularly because FOIA itself provides in subsection A of § 2.2-3704 that public records must be disclosed “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by law.” Therefore to the extent other laws provide an exemption from mandatory disclosure or prohibit the release of certain records, such laws are recognized by FOIA. However, we cannot offer independent interpretations of those laws which fall outside of FOIA. Therefore we cannot offer an opinion regarding your second question as to whether a school board is subject to [the Government Data Act].

Conclusion

The custodian of law-enforcement records possesses the discretion, except where such disclosure is prohibited by law, as to whether to invoke the exemptions provided in subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia and subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia to withhold personnel records of law-enforcement personnel. However, the custodian must release personnel records to a requester seeking his or her own records. The custodian may invoke the exemption in subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia to withhold from disclosure records of background investigations of applicants for law-enforcement agency employment, administrative investigations relating to allegations of wrongdoing by employees of a law-enforcement agency, and other administrative investigations conducted by law-enforcement agencies that are made confidential by law.

In general, this office is unable to tell whether the cited exemptions would apply to the records you requested because we are not the custodian and do not know what information is in the records. A determination on whether an exemption applies to specific records is “a mixed question of law and fact.”⁵² This office may expound on the applicable law and previously issued Virginia court precedent. However, the courts of Virginia are determiners of fact, as they possess the authority to call witnesses, hear testimony, and review records to determine whether an exemption applies to such records. If there is a factual dispute regarding whether an exemption applies in any given instance, only a court has the authority to resolve it.⁵³ Subsection E of § 2.2-3713 of the Code of Virginia states that in any action to enforce the provisions of FOIA, “the public body shall bear the burden of proof to establish an exclusion by a preponderance of the evidence.”

In light of the Supreme Court of Virginia’s ruling in Keil, the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office may properly deny access to the internal administrative investigation records pursuant to FOIA. Although you may not be able to utilize FOIA to obtain these records, you may be eligible to obtain access to such records as a “data subject” through the Government Data Act. Nevertheless, the advice of this office as previously stated in Advisory Opinion 04 (2016) regarding FOIA and the Government Data Act appears to be applicable to this matter:

Unfortunately, while we may take note of these laws [the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Government Data Act] that may have some independent bearing on access to these records this office is not the proper agency to render an interpretation of these myriad laws because of the limitation on this office’s statutory authority to FOIA matters.⁵⁴

Please be advised, as with any other type of legal matter, you may wish to consult your own attorney regarding your right of access to such records under the Government Data Act.

Thank you for contacting this office. We hope that this opinion is of assistance.

Sincerely,

Joseph Underwood
Senior Attorney

Matteo Murrelle
Staff Attorney

Alan Gernhardt, Esq.
Executive Director

¹Preston v. City of Virginia Beach, 229 Va. 235 (1985).
²Hawkins v. Town of South Hill, 301 Va. 416 (2022); see Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 06 (2024).
³Hawkins at 422.
⁴Id. at 431.
⁵Id. at 432.
⁶Id.
⁷Id. at 432 (citing Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 04 (2003)).
⁸Id. at 432 (citing Human Soc. of U.S. v. Fanslau, 54 A.D.3d 537, 538, 863 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (N.Y.App. Div. 2008).
⁹Id. at 432 (citing Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 787 N.E.2d 602, 606).
¹⁰Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 06 (2024).
¹¹Id.
¹²See Hawkins at 432 (citing Human Soc. of U.S. v. Fanslau, 54 A.D.3d 537, 538, 863 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (N.Y.App. Div. 2008).
¹³Harmon v. Ewing, 285 Va. 335, 745 S.E.2d 415 (2013); see Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 04 (2014).
¹⁴See Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3706(B) which provides, among other things, “The following records are excluded from the mandatory disclosure provisions of this chapter, but may be disclosed by the custodian, in his discretion, except where such disclosure is prohibited by law: . . . 9. Records of (i) background investigations of applicants for law-enforcement agency employment, (ii) administrative investigations relating to allegations of wrongdoing by employees of a law-enforcement agency, and (iii) other administrative investigations conducted by law-enforcement agencies that are made confidential by law.”
¹⁵Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 09 (2008).
¹⁶Id.
¹⁷Id.
¹⁸Keil v. O'Sullivan, 925 S.E.2d 326 (Va. 2026).
¹⁹See id. at 328.
²⁰See id.
²¹Id. at 328.
²²Id. at 328; footnote #1; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1); see also Department of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 383, 396, 135 S. Ct. 913, 190 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2015); Milner v. Department of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 564, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 179 L. Ed. 2d 268 (2011).
²³See id. at 328.
²⁴Id.
²⁵Id.
²⁶Id.
²⁷Id.
²⁸Id.
²⁹Id. at 329.
³⁰Id.
³¹Id.
³²Id.
³³Id. at 329 (citing Carraway v. Hill, 265 Va. 20, 23, 574 S.E.2d 274 (2003)).
³⁴See id. at 329-30; see Hinderliter v. Humphries, 224 Va. 439, 444, 297 S.E.2d 684 (1982).
³⁵See id. at 330.
³⁶Id.
³⁷Id. at 330; see Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3801.
³⁸Id. at 331 (citing Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3801).
³⁹Id. at 331; note: Public Chapter 748 (2026 Regular Session) amended Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3801 of the Government Data Act to delete, among other things, the phrase “but not limited to” from the definition of “personal information.”
⁴⁰Id. at 331-32.
⁴¹Id. at 332.
⁴²Id. at 332; see footnote #8.
⁴³See id. at 333.
⁴⁴Id. at 333; see footnote #11.
⁴⁵Id. at 333.
⁴⁶Id. at 333.
⁴⁷See Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 04 (2026), 04 (2016), 08 (2013), 04 (2007), 08 (2006), 03 (2005), and 11 (2004).
⁴⁸Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 04 (2016) and 04 (2007).
⁴⁹See Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 04 (2026) and 04 (2016).
⁵⁰Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 11 (2004).
⁵¹Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 03 (2005).
⁵²Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 09 (2019) (citing Department of Corrections v. Surovell, 290 Va. 255, 262, 776 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2015); see also American Tradition Institute, 287 Va. at 338, 756 S.E.2d at 439 (2014) (“Whether documents of the types represented in the exemplars submitted to the trial court should be excluded under [a different FOIA exemption] is a mixed question of law and fact.”).
⁵³See, e.g., Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 09 (2026), 08 (2026), and 03 (2026).
⁵⁴Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 04 (2016).

© 2026 | FOIA COUNCIL HOME | DLS HOME | GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOME