|
VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADVISORY COUNCIL
COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA |
AO-09-24
November
19, 2024
Martin
Dean
Goochland, Virginia
Request received via email
The staff of
the Freedom of Information Advisory Council is authorized
to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory
opinion is based solely upon the information presented
in your email of December 8, 2023.
Dear
Mr. Dean:
You have requested an advisory opinion relative to
the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700
et seq. of the Code of Virginia) (FOIA) on whether
the Goochland County Volunteer Fire Rescue Association
is considered a "public body" and therefore
subject to FOIA.
Factual
Background
As background information, the Goochland County Volunteer
Fire Rescue Association, Inc., (the Association) was
founded in 1951, was incorporated as a not-for-profit
in the 1970s, and is currently registered as a §
501(c)(3) corporation. The Association is funded by
the following two sources:
1. Donations from the community and interested parties;
and
2. Payments via a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with Goochland County (the County) that consists
of direct payments from the County to the Association
and indirect payments, e.g., bills paid directly
by the County for station utilities, maintenance
on Association vehicles, personal protective equipment,
etc.
You
submitted a copy of the MOU between the County and
the Association, effective July 1, 2018, that provides
that, in furtherance of the parties' partnership to
provide a safe and effective fire and rescue services
operation, the County agrees to purchase or provide
the following items:
-
Vehicle fuel for apparatus;
-
Telephone service for the stations;
-
Office supplies for fire-rescue operations only;
-
Routine trash removal for the stations (not including
removal of bulk items);
-
Janitorial supplies for operational and living areas
(not including such supplies for fundraising activities,
including room rentals);
-
Operational medical director's stipend;
-
Insurance for County-owned station, equipment, and
apparatus;
-
Electric, heat, water, and sewer services for stations;
and
-
Annual dinner and awards according to annual budget
appropriations and County purchasing requirements.
The
MOU also shows that the County agrees to purchase
or provide the following items to the Association,
including any repairs to, maintenance of, or replacement
of such items:
-
Apparatus as approved by the County fire-rescue
chief;
-
Operational uniforms and protective clothing;
-
All operational equipment and materials;
-
Station generators;
-
Station fire alarm systems and monitoring;
-
Computers, printers, copiers, scanners, and fax
machines for operational uses only; and
-
Station alerting systems.
The
MOU further shows that the County will reimburse the
Association for its receipts or paid invoices for
the following items:
-
Insurance, including vehicle, property, accident,
fraud/embezzlement, medical, and disability; and
-
Basic Internet service that conforms with County
policy for content and speed, and, where available,
basic satellite or cable television for the stations.
The
MOU states that the County will continue to make training
available to Association members and, at the discretion
of the County fire-rescue chief and upon input from
the respective district chief, reimburse individual
Association members for completed training, including
travel expenses.
Under
the MOU, the Association, in furtherance of the parties'
partnership to provide a safe and effective fire and
rescue services operation and to support its independent
fundraising and social activities, agrees to purchase
or provide the following items:
-
Office supplies for fundraising and nonoperational
needs;
-
Janitorial supplies for fundraising and nonoperational
needs, including meeting room rentals;
-
Satellite or cable television or Internet in excess
of basic services;
-
Association-specific apparel;
-
Association treasurer salary; and
-
Annual audit by a certified public accountant for
the Association's books and records.
The
Association also agrees to provide the County with
copies of its insurance policies and annual audits.
To the extent that insurance policies paid for by
the Association provide proceeds for apparatus, equipment,
or other items for which the County is responsible
for maintenance, replacement, and repair, the Association
agrees to remit those proceeds to the County.
Under the MOU, the Association also agrees to purchase
or provide the following items, including any repairs
to, maintenance of, or replacement of such items:
-
Furniture at Association-owned stations;
-
Building maintenance and upkeep, including electrical,
mechanical, and plumbing systems at Association-owned
stations or Association sheds or fixtures at the
County-owned station. Building maintenance and upkeep
also includes the roof, interior and exterior lighting,
and interior and exterior paint;
-
Parking lots at Association-owned stations, including
snow and ice removal; and
-
Any apparatus, equipment, and materials purchased
by the Association for fundraising or social activities
or purchased for operational use without the approval
of the County's fire-rescue chief.
You
stated in your email that the County operates combination
departments "staffed with career and volunteer
first responders" and that "career staff
is first out for every call in the County with volunteers
sometimes adding to manpower." You also wrote
that stations are staffed 24 hours a day, seven days
a week "with career staff and supplemented from
time to time with volunteers." You explained
that the "[v]olunteers sometimes stay at the
station but generally maintain availability from their
homes." In addition, you explained that "Goochland
is not unique in that the volunteer compliment has
been declining over the past many years."
You
explained that the Association owns and operates five
fire stations in Goochland County and the County owns
one station. You stated that "[i]t is the purview
of the [Goochland] County Fire Rescue Department to
specify, schedule the purchase, fund and execute the
purchase, title, insure, fuel and maintain the vehicles."
In addition, "[t]he vehicles do not appear as
assets of the Association and no money for them flows
through the Association" and that "[t]he
same can be said for the equipment that is used on
the vehicles."
You
provided a copy of the Association's current bylaws
that provide the manner and method by which the Association
is organized and operates. The bylaws also show that
the Association's purpose includes the solicitation
of funds for the purposes of the organization and
provisions to build, own, and maintain buildings and
equipment to be used in connection with the purposes
of the organization but does not require the Association
to provide "apparatus or vehicles, only people,
buildings and equipment."
You
also submitted a copy of Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) Form 990 from 2021 that details the Association's
finances. You stated that the "Association files
annual 990 forms with the IRS which generally shows
funding from Goochland County at under fifty percent
(50%)." The provided Form 990 shows that the
Association's revenue in 2021 was $286,606 from "fundraising
events"; $171,588 from "government grants";
and $198,698 from "all other contributions, gifts,
grants, and similar amounts not included above."
According to the form, the Association's revenue for
2021 totaled $656,892. Thus, $370,286, or approximately
56 percent, of the Association's revenue appears to
derive from some form of grant. However, it was not
clear from the information provided whether this revenue
was from competitive grants, such as procurement contracts
for services, or from noncompetitive grants, such
as governmental appropriations.
You
wrote in your email that the Association would like
to know "if there is a specific percentage threshold
applicable in making a determination of whether FOIA
provisions would apply to an entity supported wholly
or principally by public funds."
Analysis
FOIA policy as stated in subsection B of § 2.2-3700
of the Code of Virginia provides the following:
By enacting this chapter, the General Assembly ensures
the people of the Commonwealth ready access to public
records in the custody of a public body or its officers
and employees, and free entry to meetings of public
bodies wherein the business of the people is being
conducted. The affairs of government are not intended
to be conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy since
at all times the public is to be the beneficiary
of any action taken at any level of government.
Unless a public body or its officers or employees
specifically elect to exercise an exemption provided
by this chapter or any other statute, every meeting
shall be open to the public and all public records
shall be available for inspection and copying upon
request. All public records and meetings shall be
presumed open, unless an exemption is properly invoked.
FOIA policy in this subsection also provides the following:
The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally
construed to promote an increased awareness by all
persons of governmental activities and afford every
opportunity to citizens to witness the operations
of government. Any exemption from public access
to records or meetings shall be narrowly construed
and no record shall be withheld or meeting closed
to the public unless specifically made exempt pursuant
to this chapter or other specific provision of law.
This chapter shall not be construed to discourage
the free discussion by government officials or employees
of public matters with the citizens of the Commonwealth.
A first step in understanding whether FOIA applies
to a specific entity is making a determination as
to whether such entity meets the definition of a "public
body" under FOIA. Pursuant to § 2.2-3701
of the Code of Virginia, a "public body"
means the following:
[A]ny
legislative body, authority, board, bureau, commission,
district, or agency of the Commonwealth or of any
political subdivision of the Commonwealth, including
counties, cities, and towns, municipal councils,
governing bodies of counties, school boards, and
planning commissions; governing boards of public
institutions of higher education; and other
organizations, corporations, or agencies in the
Commonwealth supported wholly or principally by
public funds. It shall include (i) the Virginia
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program
and its board of directors established pursuant
to Chapter 50 (§ 38.2-5000 et seq.) of Title
38.2 and (ii) any committee, subcommittee, or other
entity however designated of the public body created
to perform delegated functions of the public body
or to advise the public body. It shall not exclude
any such committee, subcommittee, or entity because
it has private sector or citizen members. (emphasis
added)
In
this matter, the relevant language in the definition
for a "public body" is "other organizations,
corporations, or agencies in the Commonwealth supported
wholly or principally by public funds." This
specific phrase requires further consideration and
analysis in order to answer fully the question presented
by the Association.
In many prior advisory opinions, this office has been
asked to determine whether a specific entity "supported
wholly or principally by public funds" was a
"public body" under FOIA.1 The Supreme Court
of Virginia has previously expressed the following:
Under
fundamental rules of statutory construction, each
statute must be examined in its entirety, rather
than by isolating particular words or phrases. The
legislature's intent must be determined from the
words used, unless a literal construction would
yield an absurd result. Thus, when the language
employed in a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the courts are bound by the plain meaning of that
language.2
Additionally,
the Supreme Court of Virginia has declared that "[e]very
part of a statute is presumed to have some effect
and no part will be considered meaningless unless
absolutely necessary."3 When interpreting statutory
language in the past, this office has acknowledged
that "if there is no question of interpretation
and the statutory language at issue is clear and unambiguous,
we follow its plain meaning."4 As FOIA does not
define "principally," this office has also
opined that when appropriate "we also apply rules
of statutory construction as needed."5 The Supreme
Court of Virginia has stated that "when a statute
contains no express definition of a term, the general
rule of statutory construction is to infer the legislature's
intent from the language used."6 Thus, in accordance
with "statutory construction rules, in the absence
of a statutory definition, a term is considered to
have its ordinary meaning, given the context in which
it is used."7
In
a 2001 opinion, this office wrote:
Reading the definition of a public body, with the
word "principally" being used in conjunction
with the word "wholly," it would appear
that an entity that was supported principally by
public funds would receive its main source of money
for its operating budget from government sources.
Construing this in a liberal fashion, as directed
by the policy of FOIA, this means something less
than 100 percent, yet more than a simple majority
of the money in the budget. As a general rule, one
could construe that an entity that received at least
two-thirds, or 66.6 percent, of its operating budget
from government sources would be supported principally
by public funds.
Despite
this general guideline, the question of whether
an entity is supported principally by public funds
remains a question of fact, and an entity that receives
less than two-thirds of its funding from government
sources could still be considered a public body.
By way of example, consider an entity that receives
55 percent of its funding from a government source.
If it received the remaining 45 percent of its funding
from one single private source, then it would not
appear to be principally supported by public funds.
Relying back on the definitions of "principal"
set forth in the Attorney General's opinion, the
government funds would not be the most important
or primary source of money in its operating budget.
However, consider how the outcome may change if
the remaining 45 percent of the funding consisted
of small amounts of money from many different sources.
In this second scenario, the 55 percent of the support
from a government source might be the most important
or primary source of funds, if the funding from
each of the other sources only represented a small
fraction of the overall budget.
In
conclusion, FOIA does not define what it means for
a public body to be supported . . . principally
by public funds. In applying ordinary meaning
of the word "principal," in light of the
liberal construction rule set forth in the policy
of FOIA, the general guideline that emerges is that
an entity is supported principally by public funds
if it receives two-thirds of its funding from a
government source. However, this two-thirds standard
is merely a guideline, and not an absolute rule.
An entity that receives less than two-thirds of
its funding from a government source could still
nonetheless qualify as a public body. The question
of whether an entity is supported principally by
public funds remains a question of fact, and one
necessarily determined on a case-by-case basis.
One must examine the amount of the public funding
in totality with the amount of funding from each
other source in order to reach a conclusion.8
As
a general principle for FOIA, "an entity that
received at least two-thirds, or 66.6 percent, of
its operating budget from government sources would
be supported wholly or principally by public funds."9
However, previously issued advisory opinions "cautioned
that the two-thirds rule is merely a guideline, and
that ultimately the question of whether an entity
is supported principally by public funds is a question
of fact that must be decided on a case-by-case basis."10
For instance, in The Voice v. Appalachian Regional
Community Services, Inc., the Circuit Court of
Buchanan County, citing previous FOIA Council opinions,
determined that "whether an organization is 'supported
. . . principally by public funds' depends on the
total contribution from public funds as measured against
the number and magnitude of individual private contributions."11
The Circuit Court of Buchanan County held that "an
organization was a public body subject to FOIA because
it received at least 54.94 percent of its funds from
a county in the form of three checks, and the rest
of its support came from 'a number of smaller payments
from a variety of private sources.'"12
This
office has also received on multiple occasions specific
requests to consider whether a volunteer rescue squad
or fire department would be considered a public body
under FOIA.13 In an early opinion from 2000, this office
determined based upon the facts presented that "it
does not appear that a volunteer rescue squad that
is supported largely by public donations would fall
under the definition of a public body" because
"[p]ublic funding would not include voluntary,
private donations, either from individuals or an organization
such as the United Way."14 "Public funds,
as used in the definition, refers to government expenditures
of money to support agencies or organizations"
and to be considered a public body "an organization
would have to be supported 'wholly or principally'
by money received from a state or local government."15
Conversely, in an opinion from 2003, this office opined
that the Appalachia Volunteer Fire Department appeared
to be a public body that "must comply with the
procedures set forth in FOIA regarding access to public
records and meetings" because it received "nearly
90 percent of its funding from state and local government
sources, with the remaining ten percent of its funds
coming from donations and contracts."16
In
other opinions, this office considered "whether
payments made under a public contract should be used
in determining whether a private entity is principally
supported by public funds."17 "The [FOIA]
Council has previously opined that money received
through [competitive] grants 'is more akin to a procurement
transaction than an appropriation of funds,' and concluded
that grant money 'should not be included in determining
whether [a private entity] is wholly or principally
supported by public funds.'"18 Additionally, "money
received from competitive public grants and from procurement
transactions should not be considered public funds
for the purpose of determining whether the entity
is a public body subject to FOIA." "Competitive
grants are akin to public contracts negotiated between
independent parties at arms' length, and are not to
be considered public funds for purposes of
determining whether an entity is a public body."20
"A
private entity does not become a public body solely
because the private entity provides goods or services
to a public body through a procurement transaction."21
"If money from such arm's-length transactions
were considered public funds, it would have a chilling
effect on the willingness of private companies to
contract with government, as it would require private
companies to open their records to public scrutiny
solely because they entered into a contract with government."22
For "procurement transactions, the public has
a right to find out how much the government spent
and what goods or services the government received"
and "[t]hose records can be obtained from the
government."23 "In the case of procurements
and grants, a requester can generally obtain financial
records from the public body on one side of the transaction
without seeking records from the private party on
the other side of the transaction."24 "By
contrast, money given through government largess to
support a private organization, corporation, or agency
without the provision of goods or services in return
should be treated differently under FOIA."25 Noncompetitive
grants "that are more akin to appropriations
or an exercise of governmental largesse may be considered
public funds for FOIA purposes."26
When
requested to consider various factual scenarios on
whether an entity is a public body wholly or principally
supported by public funds, this office has previously
opined that a determination "depends on the status
of the entity at the time a request for records is
made under FOIA."27 Variable measures like procurement
transaction proceeds that may vary month to month
"should not be used to determine an entity's
level of public funding" because "the use
of such variable measures may lead to the untenable
result that the entity may be subject to FOIA one
month then exempt from FOIA the next."28 The information
from the Association's Form 990 from 2021 appears
to show that approximately 56 percent of the Association's
revenue for that year comes from some form of grant,
but the information does not clearly provide whether
it was from competitive or noncompetitive grants.
Furthermore, this office previously opined that "if
55 percent of the budget came from public funds and
45 percent from another single source, then the public
funds would not be the principal source," but
"if the 45 percent came from a number of sources,
each representing a relatively small fraction of the
overall budget, then the 55 percent from public funds
would be the principal source."29 Because it is
not clear what type of grant money is received by
the Association, a determination cannot be made with
any certainty as to whether the money received by
the Association should be considered public funds.30
Therefore, this office is unable to provide a conclusive
response to your question about the Association's
status as a public body.
If
the Association's financial support in 2021 is determined
to come mostly from noncompetitive grants — basically
government appropriations or largesse — then following
the two-thirds rule of thumb, the Association would
usually be considered a public body supported principally
by public funds at that time.31 However, if the financial
support of the Association is revealed to come from
competitive grants or contracts for services, then
generally the Association would seem not to be supported
principally by public funds at that time.32 Nevertheless,
this office lacks the information and "the financial
expertise to fully and accurately determine"
the Association's financial status at the time of
your request in 2024.33 Furthermore, "while this
office is authorized by statute to provide advisory
opinions regarding FOIA, we do not have the authority
to make binding factual determinations regarding the
funding provided to" the Association. "34This
office is not a fact-finding body or trier of fact."35
Although
the material you provided was useful regarding certain
aspects of the Association's funding mechanisms in
2021, it does not include the necessary information
to describe accurately the Association's financial
support at the time of your request in 2023. Absent
the applicable information, this office is unable
to conclude definitively whether the Association is
supported principally by public funds and whether
it should be treated as a public body subject to FOIA.
You may consider seeking further information from
the public bodies, such as the County, about the amount
and type of funding annually provided to the Association.
You may also wish to consult your own legal counsel
to provide you further guidance regarding the financial
and legal status of the Association. Hopefully, this
opinion provides a thorough explanation of the FOIA
Council's interpretation of "supported wholly
or principally by public funds" under FOIA and
serves as a beneficial guide to your organization.
Thank you for contacting this office. We hope that
this opinion is of assistance.
Sincerely,
Joseph
Underwood
Senior Attorney
Alan
Gernhardt
Executive Director
1See
Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 02 (2023),
05 (2017), 01 (2015), 07 (2012), 10 (2008), 07 (2007),
07 (2006), 09 (2005), 28 (2004), 06 (2004), 03 (2004),
09 (2003), 36 (2001), and 16 (2000).
2Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
06 (2024) and 09 (2019) (citing Ragan v. Woodcroft
Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 325-26, 497
S.E.2d 740, 742 (1998) (internal citations and quotations
omitted)).
3Id. (citing Davis v. MKR
Development, LLC, 295 Va. 488, 494, 814 S.E.2d
179, 182 (2018) (quoting City of Richmond v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 292 Va. 70, 75, 787 S.E.2d
161, 164 (2016)).
4Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
02 (2021) See, e.g., Cole v. Smyth County Bd.
of Supervisors, 298 Va. 625, 636, 842 S.E.2d
389, 394 (2020) ("In construing statutory language,
we are bound by the plain meaning of clear and unambiguous
language." (quoting White Dog Publishing,
Inc. v. Culpeper County Bd. of Supervisors, 272
Va. 377, 386, 634 S.E.2d 334 (2006))).
5Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
09 (2019).
6Id. (citing American Tradition
Institute v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia, 287 Va. 330, 341, 756 S.E.2d 435,
441 (2014)).
7Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
36 (2001) (citing Commonwealth Department of Taxation
v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Service, 220 Va.
655, 261 S.E. 2d 532 (1980); 1991 Op. Atty. Gen. Va.
413; 1986-87 Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 174; see generally
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction,
6th ed., § 46:01); See also Freedom of Information
Advisory Opinion 09 (2019) (citing American Tradition
Institute v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia, 287 Va. 330, 341, 756 S.E.2d 435,
441 (2014) (quoting Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P'ship,
255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998))).
8Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
36 (2001).
9See Freedom of Information Advisory
Opinions 02 (2023), 05 (2017), 01 (2015), 07 (2012),
10 (2008), 07 (2007), 07 (2006), 09 (2005), 28 (2004),
06 (2004), 03 (2004), 09 (2003), 36 (2001), and 16
(2000).
10Id.
11The Voice v. Appalachian Regional
Community Services, Inc., 89 Va. Cir. 284 (Buchanan
County 2014) (finding that an organization that received
at least 54.94 percent of its support from public
funds was a public body); Wigand v. Wilkes,
65 Va. Cir. 437 (City of Norfolk 2004) (finding that
a corporation that received 25 percent of its support
from public funds was not a public body).
12The Voice, 89 Va. Cir. at 287.
13See Freedom of Information Advisory
Opinions 09 (2003) and 16 (2000).
14Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
16 (2000).
15Id.
16Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
09 (2003).
17Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
10 (2008), 28 (2004), and 06 (2004).
18Id.
19Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
09 (2005), 28 (2004) (regarding procurement transactions),
and 06 (2004) (regarding grants); see Freedom of Information
Advisory Opinion 07 (2006).
20Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
07 (2007), 07 (2006), 28 (2004), and 06 (2004).
21Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
28 (2004).
22See Freedom of Information Advisory
Opinions 05 (2017), 10 (2008), and 28 (2004).
23Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
28 (2004).
24Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
09 (2005), 28 (2004), and 06 (2004).
25Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
28 (2004).
26Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
10 (2008) and 07 (2007).
27Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
05 (2017), 09 (2005), and 22 (2004).
28Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
09 (2005) and 28 (2004).
29Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
01 (2015) and 36 (2001).
30See Freedom of Information Advisory
Opinion 05 (2017).
31See Freedom of Information Advisory
Opinions 05 (2017), 10 (2008), and 07 (2007).
32Id.
33Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
09 (2005).
34Id.
35Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
04 (2024), 01 (2023), 01 (2022), 01 (2021), 05 (2017),
03 (2016), 04 (2015), 02 (2015), 02 (2013), and 09
(2005).
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