|
VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADVISORY COUNCIL
COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA |
AO-06-24
September
6, 2024
Alice
Minium
Richmond, Virginia
Request received via email
The staff of the Freedom of Information Advisory Council
is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing
staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information
presented in your email of September 12, 2023.
Dear
Ms. Minium:
You have requested an advisory opinion relative to
the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700
et seq. of the Code of Virginia) (FOIA) on whether
or not Virginia citizens are entitled to access the
records of actual compensation earnings, including
overtime earnings, bonus pay, and actual gross compensation,
for government officials or only to access the records
of official salary or base rate of pay for such officials.
Factual Background
As background information, you submitted FOIA requests
as part of an annual data collection effort to approximately
340 law-enforcement agencies in Virginia. For the
purposes of this opinion, our understanding is that
all of the law-enforcement agencies you contacted
are subject to FOIA. In each request, you asked for
a "roster of all sworn law enforcement employees
on payroll [. . .] as of today's date." You also
specified that you requested "the responsive
records to include several types of data, including
the following for each employee: salary pay, overtime
pay, bonus pay, and total compensation for the last
fiscal year." For each of these last three data
points, you specified that "the figure provided
should indicate the Fiscal Year 2023 Actual Payout."
You
stated in your email to this office that you were
"surprised to discover that while public bodies
are mostly in consensus regarding their obligations
to disclose official salary and rate of pay under
§ 2.2-3705.1(1) [of the Code of Virginia], there
is no apparent consensus regarding their obligation
to disclose employees' actual pay." You stated
that you have received similar responses from a few
law-enforcement agencies in which the "[o]fficial
salary was provided, but overtime pay and bonus pay
were withheld." However, you also stated that
several other law-enforcement agencies "did opt
to disclose employees' actual pay."
In
your email, you also stated that "the contents
of these records have only served to underscore the
importance of accessing this data everywhere: employees'
actual compensation and their base salary (or official
rate of pay) are often drastically different numbers."
You cited one example in which a law-enforcement agency
disclosed that one of their officers "earned
$86,993.66 in base salary pay for fiscal year 2023,
but earned $143,487.13 in actual compensation."
You noted that "$60,163.18 [of the officer's
earned actual compensation] was earmarked as overtime
pay."
As
this office was aware of pending litigation between
you and a law-enforcement agency in regards to access
of the requested information, we requested that you
clarify the actual matter to be litigated. You explained
that the pending litigation between you and the law-enforcement
agency was concerning the issue of access to an agency's
roster of all sworn law-enforcement employees on payroll
of that particular agency and not regarding access
to the records of overtime and bonus compensation
paid to public employees. You responded that the pending
litigation currently in circuit court is "entirely
unrelated and has no bearing on the subject at hand."
The
FOIA Council adopted a policy regarding requests for
advisory opinions on matters during or after litigation.1
The policy requires this office to decline to issue
an advisory opinion on a matter that is before a court
or on which a court has ruled. However, in this instance,
it is our understanding that the request for this
advisory opinion is not an issue currently before
or previously adjudicated by a court; the request
is to determine whether the disclosure of information
(i.e. records of the "official salary, or rate
of pay of, and records of the allowances or reimbursements
for expenses paid to, any officer, official, or employee
of a public body") is mandatory as required in
subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of
Virginia and whether overtime and bonus compensation
paid to public employees is to be included when calculating
an employee's official salary or base rate of pay.
FOIA
Policy and Statutory Construction
FOIA
policy, as stated in relevant part in subsection B
of § 2.2-3700 of the Code of Virginia, is to
ensure "the people of the Commonwealth ready
access to public records in the custody of a public
body or its officers and employees." FOIA policy
also states that "[t]he affairs of government
are not intended to be conducted in an atmosphere
of secrecy since at all times the public is to be
the beneficiary of any action taken at any level of
government." In addition, "[u]nless a public
body or its officers or employees specifically elect
to exercise an exemption provided by this chapter
or any other statute, [. . .] all public records shall
be available for inspection and copying upon request."
Furthermore, the provisions of FOIA:
shall
be liberally construed to promote an increased awareness
by all persons of governmental activities and afford
every opportunity to citizens to witness the operations
of government. Any exemption from public access
to records or meetings shall be narrowly construed
and no record shall be withheld or meeting closed
to the public unless specifically made exempt pursuant
to this chapter or other specific provision of law.
Hence, "[a]ll public records shall be presumed
open, unless an exemption is properly invoked."
The requirement for interpreting exemptions as narrowly
construed has commonly been referred to as "the
narrow construction rule of FOIA."2 Moreover,
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Gloss v. Wheeler
recognized this FOIA-specific rule of construction,
stating that it "'puts the interpretative thumb
on the scale in favor of' open government."3
Following
the stated statutory policy, this office has stated
that "exemptions must be 'narrowly construed'
in favor of disclosure."4 Moreover, "if a
statute does not specifically exempt a record from
disclosure, it must be made available for public inspection
and copying under FOIA."5 Thus, "if there
is no question of interpretation and the statutory
language at issue is clear and unambiguous, we follow
its plain meaning."6
This
office has previously opined that when analyzing a
statutory exemption, we "apply rules of statutory
construction as needed."7 The Supreme Court of
Virginia has previously stated that:
Under
fundamental rules of statutory construction, each
statute must be examined in its entirety, rather
than by isolating particular words or phrases. The
legislature's intent must be determined from the
words used, unless a literal construction would
yield an absurd result. Thus, when the language
employed in a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the courts are bound by the plain meaning of that
language.8
In
addition, the Court has also stated that "[e]very
part of a statute is presumed to have some effect
and no part will be considered meaningless unless
absolutely necessary."9
Personnel
and Law-Enforcement Exemptions
In
this matter, an applicable exclusion to the provisions
of FOIA10 may be found in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1
of the Code of Virginia, which states, in full, that:
The
following information contained in a public record
is excluded from the mandatory disclosure provisions
of this chapter but may be disclosed by the custodian
in his discretion, except where such disclosure
is prohibited by law. Redaction of information excluded
under this section from a public record shall be
conducted in accordance with § 2.2-3704.01.
1.
Personnel information concerning identifiable individuals,
except that access shall not be denied to the person
who is the subject thereof. Any person who is the
subject of such information and who is 18 years
of age or older may waive, in writing, the protections
afforded by this subdivision. If the protections
are so waived, such information shall be disclosed.
Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to
authorize the withholding of any resumes or applications
submitted by persons who are appointed by the Governor
pursuant to § 2.2-106 or 2.2-107.
No
provision of this chapter or any provision of Chapter
38 (§ 2.2-3800 et seq.) shall be construed
as denying public access to (i) contracts between
a public body and its officers or employees, other
than contracts settling public employee employment
disputes held confidential as personnel records
under § 2.2-3705.1; (ii) records of the name,
position, job classification, official salary, or
rate of pay of, and records of the allowances or
reimbursements for expenses paid to, any officer,
official, or employee of a public body; or (iii)
the compensation or benefits paid by any corporation
organized by the Virginia Retirement System or its
officers or employees. The provisions of this subdivision,
however, shall not require public access to records
of the official salaries or rates of pay of public
employees whose annual rate of pay is $10,000 or
less.
As
previously considered by this office, "[b]ecause
of the nature of certain information contained within
a personnel file, the personnel record exemption is
a privacy-based exemption, designed to protect the
subjects of the records from the dissemination of
personal information."11 Subdivision 1 of §
2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia establishes a discretionary
exclusion to FOIA that allows a public body to withhold
"personnel information concerning identifiable
individuals" from release publicly. Yet, this
same exclusion in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1
of the Code of Virginia also contains a provision
that requires that specified information such as "the
records of the name, position, job classification,
official salary, or rate of pay of, and records of
the allowances or reimbursements for expenses paid
to, any officer, official, or employee of a public
body" must be disclosed if requested. Hence,
this exclusion to FOIA that allows for the withholding
of personnel information contains its own exception
that requires that certain information be disclosed.
Additionally, noncriminal records prepared, owned,
or possessed by law-enforcement agencies are to be
administered in accordance with subsection D of §
2.2-3706 of the Code of Virginia, which provides,
in relevant part, that:
Access
to personnel records of persons employed by a public
body engaged in emergency medical services or fire
protection services, a law-enforcement agency, or
an emergency 911 system or any other equivalent
reporting system shall be governed by the provisions
of subdivision B 9 and subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1,
as applicable.
Additionally
certain records may be exempt from mandatory disclosure
pursuant to subdivision B 9 of § 2.2-3706 of
the Code of Virginia, which provides for the exemption
of the following:
Records
of (i) background investigations of applicants for
law-enforcement agency employment, (ii) administrative
investigations relating to allegations of wrongdoing
by employees of a law-enforcement agency, and (iii)
other administrative investigations conducted by
law-enforcement agencies that are made confidential
by law.
While
this exemption would allow these types of records
to be withheld, your inquiries "for the salary
pay, overtime pay, bonus pay, and total compensation
for the last fiscal year" paid to employees of
law-enforcement agencies would not be excluded from
disclosure by this exemption. Note also that another
exemption to FOIA, subdivision B 8 of § 2.2-3706
of the Code of Virginia, provides for the exemption
of:
Those
portions of any records containing information related
to undercover operations or protective details that
would reveal the staffing, logistics, or tactical
plans of such undercover operations or protective
details. Nothing in this subdivision shall operate
to allow the withholding of information concerning
the overall costs or expenses associated with undercover
operations or protective details.
In
addition, subdivision B 10 of § 2.2-3706 of the
Code of Virginia provides that the identity of any
undercover officer may be withheld from disclosure.
In accordance with these exemptions and following
the narrow construction rule of FOIA, the identity
of undercover officers, which possibly includes the
name, position, and job classification of the officers,
may be withheld from disclosure. The "official
salary, or rate of pay of, and records of the allowances
or reimbursements for expenses paid to" those
individuals working as undercover officers still would
be subject to disclosure, but the disclosure of such
information may be in such a manner that the identity
of the undercover officers is protected and not released
publicly. Even so, subdivision B 8 of § 2.2-3706
of the Code of Virginia requires a law-enforcement
agency to disclose the overall costs or expenses associated
with undercover operations or protective details if
requested. Because information on undercover law-enforcement
officers was not the focus of your inquiry here or
dispositive of the analysis of the issues in this
matter, and is the subject of litigation, we will
not consider that issue further in this opinion. However,
it is important to acknowledge the existence of the
exclusions in FOIA that allow for certain information
regarding those individuals employed as undercover
law-enforcement officers to be withheld from disclosure.
Nonetheless,
in this matter, the applicable exclusion to FOIA may
be found in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of
the Code of Virginia, which provides a discretionary
exemption for "personnel information concerning
identifiable individuals" but requires the release
of "records of the name, position, job classification,
official salary, or rate of pay of, and records of
the allowances or reimbursements for expenses paid
to, any officer, official, or employee of a public
body," among other records.
Applicable Case Law
Hawkins
v. South Hill
In
2022, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued an opinion
in the case Hawkins v. Town of South Hill
that expounded on the exclusion for personnel information
in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code
of Virginia.12 In this matter, Mr. Hawkins requested
documents from the Town of South Hill (Town) "relating
to employment disputes involving the Town Manager
and various employees."13 Following the response
from the Town in which it provided many of the requested
records but withheld some records from release pursuant
to the FOIA exemption in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1
of the Code of Virginia, Mr. Hawkins filed a petition
for a writ of mandamus in the Mecklenburg County Circuit
Court requesting the release of the withheld records.
Mr. Hawkins's petition asserted that the Town applied
the FOIA "exemptions too broadly and withheld
documents that should have been released or redacted."14
Mr. Hawkins "requested the circuit court to compel
the Town to produce the requested documents, impose
civil penalties under [FOIA], and award him his attorney’s
fees and costs."15
After
in camera review of the withheld records
in accordance with Bergano v. City of Virginia
Beach,16 the circuit court narrowed the focus of
the dispute between the two parties to seven of the
records requested by Mr. Hawkins. The circuit court
"applied definitions of 'personnel record' from
a previous version of the statute, instead of 'personnel
information.'"17 The court determined that one
record was not exempt, another was partially exempt,
while five others were entirely exempt from disclosure.
Additionally, "[t]he court did not address the
issue of fees or whether Hawkins substantially prevailed."18
As a result, Mr. Hawkins appealed to the Supreme Court
of Virginia "the partial denial of his petition
for a writ of mandamus and the purported denial of
his request for attorney’s fees and costs" by
the circuit court.19
In
Hawkins, the Supreme Court examined "the
scope of the personnel information exemption to [FOIA]"
and attempted to "reconcile the competing interests
of open access to public records and the privacy expectations
of government employees."20 In their analysis of
the plain meanings of “personnel information"
in relation to "personnel records" the justices
determined "that the only content exempt from
disclosure is that which is tied to the employment
of the individual in some way, and which otherwise
would not be disclosed to the employer."21 The
Supreme Court assessed that this provision of FOIA
was not intended "to exempt all employment information
from the view of the public, but only that which is
private."22
The
Supreme Court, therefore, held that:
"[P]ersonnel
information" for purposes of Code § 2.2-3705.1(1)
[of the Code of Virginia] means data, facts, or
statements within a public record relating to a
specific government employee, which are in the possession
of the entity solely because of the individual's
employment relationship with the entity, and are
private, but for the individual's employment with
the entity.23
The
Supreme Court recognized this office's previous analysis
and determined that the definition for "'personnel
information' exemption, like the 'personnel record'
exemption before it, is a 'privacy-based exemption,
designed to protect the subject of the record from
the dissemination of personal information.'"24
The Supreme Court held "that data, facts, and
statements are private if their disclosure would constitute
an 'unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' to a
reasonable person under the circumstances."25 The
Supreme Court further expounded that "the 'precise
contours' of what content qualifies as private are
'neither rigid nor precise' and require determination
in the context of each case."26
While
acknowledging that the circuit court erred in its
interpretation by allowing "the Town to withhold
the entirety of all five documents at issue without
any redactions, using definitions of 'personnel record'
under a prior version of Code § 2.2-3705.1",
the Supreme Court also recognized "that the trial
court was without clear guidance on what constitutes
'personnel information' under [FOIA]."27 The Supreme
Court determined that "the trial court is in
the best position to assess the 'precise contours'
of what is private in the context of this case,"
and therefore, remanded "the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion" for
the trial court to review and, if necessary, redact
and release the records at issue.28 Moreover, because
Hawkins failed to obtain a ruling from the circuit
court as to who, if anyone, was the prevailing party
or on the issue of attorney fees and costs, the Supreme
Court found that Mr. Hawkins had waived those issues
on appeal, and since there was no ruling to address
on appeal, "consequently [affirmed] the circuit
court on both assignments."29
LeMond
v. McElroy
In LeMond v. McElroy, the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered a matter in which a requester
sought to obtain copies of a "'settlement agreement,'
a payment request for a settlement check to be drawn,
and a computer sheet showing the amount paid in the
settlement" between another citizen and a public
body.30 On behalf of the public body and its custodian
of records, the Office of the Attorney General of
Virginia (Attorney General) argued that the requested
information was exempt from the mandatory disclosure
requirements of FOIA pursuant to the exemption for
legal memoranda and other work product compiled specifically
for use in litigation.31 The Attorney General argued
that the plain language of the exemption provided
that the requested records were exempt from mandatory
disclosure and also contended "that a settlement
agreement is prepared and entered into by litigants
for a single purpose, to bring an end to pending litigation."32
The Attorney General further argued that there was
"quite simply, no nonlitigation purpose for preparing
and executing a settlement agreement."33 The requester's
legal counsel asserted that settlement agreements
are not compiled specifically for use in litigation
but "are contracts between parties terminating
a dispute, in effect, an alternative to litigation."34
Furthermore, the requester's counsel contended that
"accounting records reflecting payment of a settlement
that are compiled in the ordinary course of business
to record the expenditure of public funds are even
further removed from the litigation process and plainly
not 'compiled specifically for use in litigation.'"35
As
there was no record or description of the settlement
agreement made available for in camera inspection,
the Supreme Court refused "to decide the issue
in a vacuum, without any idea of the precise nature
of the document" and upheld the trial court's
ruling but without approval.36 The Court determined
not to reverse the trial court's ruling "because
the responsibility for presenting an adequate appellate
record is upon the appellant who seeks reversal of
the decision."37 Unlike the settlement agreement,
of which there was no record or description for the
Court to review, and "without deciding, that
the 'settlement agreement' is exempt from disclosure
under [FOIA]," the Court held "that these
accounting records nevertheless must be produced for
inspection and copying."38 The Court further concluded
that "the accounting records in dispute are not
documents 'compiled specifically for use in litigation,'
construing the exemption narrowly according to its
plain meaning."39 The Court stated that "[t]hese
are documents generated in connection with the payment
process, after the mutual agreement to settle."40
The Court also wrote that "[t]he request for
the settlement check was prepared to execute the settlement
agreement, and the computer sheet recorded the expenditure
of public funds."41 Accordingly, the Court affirmed
the order of the trial court and remanded the case
"for an appropriate modification of the deadline
for inspection and copying of the records and for
service of the writ of mandamus upon LeMond."42
Previous
Advisory Opinions
Previously, this office has been presented with citizens'
requests for release of copies of settlement agreements
between public bodies and their officials or employees.
In general, FOIA provides that "contracts settling
public employee employment disputes may be withheld
as personnel records, but other contracts between
a public body and its officers or employees must be
disclosed."43 In following the Supreme Court of
Virginia's holding in LeMond "that accounting
records relating to a settlement agreement are subject
to public disclosure," this office stated in
a prior opinion that "individual documents reflecting
the amount paid in a settlement or to an attorney
are public record."44 In a separate opinion, this
office noted that in LeMond "the [Supreme]
Court drew a clear distinction between the settlement
agreement itself and accounting records reflecting
payments made pursuant to that agreement."45 This
office recognized that by "[a]pplying the narrow
construction rule to the facts, the [Supreme] Court
held that even if the settlement agreement was exempt,
the accounting records were not."46 Thus, this
office concluded that "[t]he implied policy is
clear: the public gets to see how its tax dollars
are spent, even while personnel records, including
settlement agreements, may be withheld from public
disclosure."47
Similarly,
this office has received inquiries from citizens regarding
requests to public bodies for the personnel and payroll
records of their officials or employees. This office
has considered that "[w]hile at first glance
an employee's salary may appear to be very personal
information, it in fact addresses the expenditure
of the public's money generally" and "[t]hus
the exclusion allows for this disclosure."48 This
office opined that:
Regarding
personnel and payroll records, the personnel information
exemption found in subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1
[of the Code of Virginia] generally excepts from
mandatory disclosure "[p]ersonnel information
concerning identifiable individuals" but requires
that some such information must be disclosed, including
"records of the name, position, job classification,
official salary, or rate of pay of, and records
of the allowances or reimbursements for expenses
paid to, any officer, official, or employee of a
public body."49
Moreover,
"[p]ursuant to the personnel exemption in subdivision
1 of § 2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia, the
salary or rate of pay of any officer, official, or
employee of a public body must be disclosed if it
exceeds $10,000 per year."50
In
another instance, this office was asked to determine
whether the timesheets of a public body's employee
were subject to release or exempt from disclosure
under the exclusion for personnel information.51After
consideration, this office opined that "timesheets
contain the type of information intended to be exempted,"
because "timesheets include more information
than just job classification and rate of pay."52
Because timesheets "include more personal information,
such as whether an employee has been out of the office
frequently due to illness or has taken vacation,"
the release of timesheets could possibly be considered
an invasion of privacy as they contain private information
of a personal nature like an employee's health status.53
However, this office also recognized that if a requester
wishes "to inquire what was a particular individual's
salary or rate of pay on a particular date or a series
of dates, [then] that information would have to be
disclosed."54
Evidenced
by the varied responses by the public bodies to your
inquiry for information, several local law-enforcement
agencies provided the overtime and bonus compensation
paid to their officers either by choosing to exercise
the discretion afforded by the statute to release
the requested information or by interpreting this
provision as requiring the disclosure of the requested
information. Whereas other agencies cited this same
statutory provision when deciding not to disclose
the requested information. As to whether the exemption
for personnel information in subdivision 1 of §
2.2-3705.1 of the Code of Virginia provides that the
information regarding overtime and bonus compensation
paid to public employees is included as part of the
records of the "official salary, or rate of pay
of, and records of the allowances or reimbursements
for expenses paid to, any officer, official, or employee
of a public body" that must be disclosed or whether
a public body may withhold such information under
the privacy exemption for personnel records requires
further consideration.
This
office has previously opined that:
Generally,
subsection D of § 2.2-3704 [of the Code of
Virginia] states that a public body does not need
to create a new record in response to a FOIA request
if the record does not already exist, but a public
body may abstract or summarize information under
such terms and conditions as agreed between the
requester and the public body. However, because
FOIA affirmatively requires that salary information
be available for public access, a public body would
be required to create such a record if it did not
exist at the time of the request as an exception
to the general rule stated above.55
In
another opinion the following year, this office stated
that "in the case of records of salary and job
position, public bodies have specific notice in the
Code that these specific records are public records
to which access must be granted, and to which no exemption
applies."56 Because a request for records of salary
is an exception to the general rule that a public
body does not need to create a record in response
to a request, "nothing in FOIA should be construed
to deny public access to records of the [name], position,
job classification, official salary or rate of pay
of, and records of the allowances or reimbursements
for expenses paid to any officer, official or employee
of a public body."57 This office further explained
that "[b]ecause FOIA affirmatively requires that
records of job position and salary be available to
the public, a public body would be required to create
a record containing that information if one did not
already exist."58
This
office opined further that "it is unlikely that
a public body [. . .] does not have any records indicating
the salary of its employees," because "[p]ayroll
records generated each pay period would contain information
about salary."59 Moreover, "FOIA does not
require that a public body create a list of the salary
information of all employees; it requires that salary
records be open."60 This office opined that "[i]f
such a list exists, it must be provided,"61 and
clarified that "[o]therwise, individual records
of each employee's salary would satisfy the FOIA requirements."62
Although
acknowledging that "[w]hile FOIA does require
that individuals' salary information be available
to the public, it does not require that individuals'
benefits information be disclosed."63 A public
body possesses the discretion to withhold benefits
information from release "as a personnel record."64
If "records include tax and benefits information
that is exempt from disclosure, such records may be
redacted pursuant to § 2.2-3704.01 of the Code
of Virginia so that the gross payment amount(s) would
be disclosed as the Supreme Court has indicated but
exempt tax and personnel information may be withheld."65
Nevertheless, bonus and overtime compensation paid
to public officers, officials, and employees does
not appear to qualify as benefits information.
Conclusion
FOIA affirmatively requires that "records of
the name, position, job classification, official salary,
or rate of pay of, and records of the allowances or
reimbursements for expenses paid to, any officer,
official, or employee of a public body" be made
available to the public. Meanwhile, FOIA also authorizes
withholding personnel information concerning identifiable
individuals from release. The disclosure of overtime
and bonus pay records might have implications of personal
privacy, because this information may reveal additional
information beyond that contained in a payment or
accounting record (which would be open following LeMond),
such as personnel information relative to merit-based
or incentive-based bonuses, or information on tax
withholdings (generally prohibited from release under
§ 58.1-3 of the Code of Virginia). Following
the Supreme Court's guidance in the Hawkins
case, the disclosure of overtime and bonus compensation
paid by public bodies to their public officers, officials,
and employees must be analyzed to determine whether
it constitutes "'an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy' to a reasonable person under the circumstances."66
Unfortunately,
it does not appear that any Virginia court has considered
this specific issue, so there is no controlling state
precedent upon which to rely. However, it appears
that other jurisdictions generally favor the release
of salary, overtime, and bonus information. For example,
Rhode Island's Access to Public Records law provides
for the release of such information:
Personnel
and other personal individually identifiable records
otherwise deemed confidential by federal or state
law or regulation, or the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.;
provided, however, with respect to employees, and
employees of contractors and subcontractors working
on public works projects that are required to be
listed as certified payrolls, the name, gross salary,
salary range, total cost of paid fringe benefits,
gross amount received in overtime, and any other
remuneration in addition to salary, job title, job
description, dates of employment and positions held
with the state, municipality, or public works contractor
or subcontractor on public works projects, employment
contract, work location, and/or project, business
telephone number, the city or town of residence,
and date of termination shall be public. For the
purposes of this section "remuneration"
shall include any payments received by an employee
as a result of termination, or otherwise leaving
employment, including, but not limited to, payments
for accrued sick and/or vacation time, severance
pay, or compensation paid pursuant to a contract
buy-out provision. For purposes of this section,
the city or town residence shall not be deemed public
for peace officers, as defined in § 12-7-21,
and shall not be released.67
Similarly,
regarding federal civil service, it appears that 5
C.F.R. § 293.311 (a)(4)68 requires the release,
among other records, of "[p]resent and past annual
salary rates (including performance awards or bonuses,
incentive awards, merit pay amount, Meritorious or
Distinguished Executive Ranks, and allowances and
differentials)." New Jersey's Open Public Records
Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(e), provides that "[i]mmediate
access ordinarily shall be granted to budgets, bills,
vouchers, contracts, including collective negotiations
agreements and individual employment contracts, and
public employee salary and overtime information."
Research revealed similar results in other jurisdictions
demonstrating that, in general, it appears that release
of this type of information is not considered an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy and is often explicitly
required by statute.
However,
while the Virginia personnel information exemption
requires the release of "official salary, or
rate of pay of, and records of the allowances or reimbursements
for expenses paid to, any officer, official, or employee
of a public body," it does not explicitly require
the release of bonus or overtime pay. As such, applying
rules of statutory construction, we cannot read this
language to require the release of overtime or bonus
pay. Nevertheless, this office generally recommends
releasing all information on overtime pay, bonuses,
or other compensation. First, note that following
LeMond, accounting records showing payments
made to individuals would be open. Next, consider
that information that is not specific to identifiable
individuals, such as the rates used to compute overtime
pay or information on bonuses given to all employees
or across-the-board pay raises, would all be open
to disclosure as such information would not qualify
as personnel information specific to any identifiable
individual. A requester could therefore ask for and
receive individuals' salaries and rates of pay, as
well as information on reimbursements and allowances
paid to individuals, along with accounting records
showing all payments made to individuals, and then
get other information on bonuses, overtime rates,
and other data that is not individually identifiable.
Putting all of this information together a requester
could then deduce an individual's overtime pay, bonuses,
and other additional compensation to some degree of
accuracy. Unfortunately, the actual degree of accuracy
may vary and could lead to incorrect conclusions.
It would generally be simpler, less expensive, less
time consuming, and more accurate for a public body
to disclose information on overtime pay, bonuses,
and other compensation in the first place. Additionally,
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions makes
it appear likely that such information might not meet
the Hawkins test as information that would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
were it to be released. For those reasons, this office
encourages such disclosures as a matter of best practice
even though these disclosures are not explicitly required
by statute.
Thank you for contacting this office. We hope that
this opinion is of assistance.
Sincerely,
Joseph
Underwood
Senior Attorney
Alan
Gernhardt
Executive Director
1https://foiacouncil.dls.virginia.gov/litigation.pdf
2Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
01 (2020) (See also Freedom of Information
Advisory Opinions 02 (2023), 02 (2021), 04 (2020),
04 (2019), 03 (2015), 06 (2013) and 01 (2013)).
3Gloss v. Wheeler, 301 Va. 258,
279, 887 S.E.2d 11 (2023) (citing Fitzgerald v.
Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 289 Va. 499, 505,
771 S.E.2d 858 (2015)).
4Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
02 (2021) (citing Virginia Dep't of Corrections
v. Surovell, 290 Va. 255, 263, 776 S.E.2d 579,
583 (2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Loudoun County
Sheriff's Office, 289 Va. 499, 505, 771 S.E.2d
858, 860-61 (2015)).
5Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
04 (2019) (quoting Freedom of Information Advisory
Opinion 07 (2003)).
6Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
02 (2021) See, e.g., Cole v. Smyth County Bd.
of Supervisors, 298 Va. 625, 636, 842 S.E.2d
389, 394 (2020) ("In construing statutory language,
we are bound by the plain meaning of clear and unambiguous
language." (quoting White Dog Publishing,
Inc. v. Culpeper County Bd. of Supervisors, 272
Va. 377, 386, 634 S.E.2d 334 (2006))).
7Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
09 (2019).
8Ragan v. Woodcroft Village Apartments,
255 Va. 322, 325-26, 497 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1998) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
9Davis v. MKR Development, LLC,
295 Va. 488, 494, 814 S.E.2d 179, 182 (2018) (quoting
City of Richmond v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
292 Va. 70, 75, 787 S.E.2d 161, 164 (2016)).
10See footnote 1, Am. Tradition Inst.
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 287
Va. 330, 334 (The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded
that "there is no practical distinction between
the use of the terms 'exemption' and 'exclusion' within
the context of [FOIA]. The Code, the parties, the
trial court, and this Court's prior decisions have
referred to 'exclusion' and 'exemption' interchangeably.").
11Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
07 (2002).
12See Hawkins v. Town of South Hill,
301 Va. 416 (2022).
13Id.. at 422.
14Id.
15Id.
16See Bergano v. City of Virginia Beach,
296 Va. 403 (2018).
17Hawkins at 423.
18Id.
19Id. at 422.
20Id.
21Id. at 431.
22Id. at 432.
23Id.
24Id. at 432 (citing Freedom of
Information Advisory Opinion 04 (2003)).
25Id. at 432 (citing Human Soc.
of U.S. v. Fanslau, 54 A.D.3d 537, 538, 863 N.Y.S.2d
519, 520 (N.Y.App. Div. 2008).
26Id. at 432 (citing Worcester
Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of
Worcester, 787 N.E.2d 602, 606).
27Id. at 433.
28Id. Note that while other jurisdictions
have applied the "unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy" standard in various contexts, other
than Hawkins, it does not appear that any other Virginia
court opinion has used the standard "unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy" or has given specific
examples of how it should be applied under different
factual scenarios.
29Id. at 434.
30LeMond v, McElroy, 239 Va. 515,
518, 391 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1990).
31See id. at 517.
32Id. at 519.
33Id. at 519.
34Id. at 519.
35Id. at 519-520.
36Id. at 520-521.
37Id. at 521.
38Id. at 521
39Id. at 521.
40Id. at 521.
41Id. at 521.
42Id. at 521.
43Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
06 (2013).
44Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
14 (2000).
45Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
06 (2013).
46Id. (citing LeMond,
239 Va. at 521, 391 S.E.2d at 312-313).
47Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
06 (2013).
48Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
07 (2002).
49Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
01 (2021).
50Id.
51See Freedom of Information Advisory
Opinion 07 (2002).
52Id.
53Id.
54Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
01 (2021).
55Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
11 (2003).
56Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
04 (2004).
57Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
04 (2015).
58Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions
04 (2015), 04 (2004), and 11 (2003).
59Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
04 (2004).
60Id.
61Id.
62Id.
63Id. Note that more generic information
about benefits, such as benefits options available
to all employees or to certain categories of employees,
would not be exempt as personnel records because such
information is not specific to any particular individual.
64Id.
65Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion
01 (2021).
66See Hawkins at 432 (citing Human
Soc. of U.S. v. Fanslau, 54 A.D.3d 537, 538,
863 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (N.Y.App. Div. 2008).
67Rhode Island General Laws § 38-2-2
(4)(A)(I)(b) (available at http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE38/38-2/38-2-2.htm)
68Available at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-5/chapter-I/subchapter-B/part-293/subpart-C/section-293.311.
|