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VIRGINIA
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ADVISORY COUNCIL
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
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AO-03-11
August
31, 2011
Ralph
L. "Bill" Axselle, Jr.
Richmond, Virginia
The
staff of the Freedom of Information Advisory Council is authorized
to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion
is based solely upon the information presented in your electronic
mail of August 1, 2011.
Dear
Mr. Axselle:
You
have asked whether Code of Virginia § 40.1-11 exempts
certain records of the Virginia Occupation Safety and Health
Compliance Program (VOSH) from mandatory disclosure under
the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). You relate
that under the VOSH program, private and public employers
are inspected to ensure compliance with all relevant health
and safety laws of the Commonwealth. After inspection, employers
may be cited for certain alleged health and safety violations.
The VOSH program is carried out by the Department of Labor
and Industry (DOLI). The DOLI website states the following
regarding VOSH:
The
Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Compliance Program
conducts inspections of private and public sector employers
to assure compliance with the laws, standards and regulations
of the Commonwealth. The Compliance Program may issue citations
listing violations of the standards and regulations to employers,
determines dates by which violations must be abated, and
may propose civil monetary penalties for certain types of
violations (Public Sector employers are not issued such
penalties).1
You stated
that when citations are issued, employers often submit FOIA
requests to review DOLI’s records regarding the alleged
violation, but DOLI often refuses to provide the records requested,
citing § 40.1-11 of the Code of Virginia. That Code section
provides that [n]either the Commissioner nor any employee
of the Department shall make use of or reveal any information
or statistics gathered from any person, company or corporation
for any purposes other than those of this title.2 While
acknowledging that some records are exempt from mandatory
disclosure under FOIA, you have contended that a broad interpretation
of § 40.1-11 would be inconsistent with FOIA's purposes
and language, and therefore § 40.1-11 should not be interpreted
to exempt from mandatory disclosure VOSH records regarding
an employer's violation.
The
relevant general policy of FOIA, as set forth in § 2.2-3700,
is to ensure the people of the Commonwealth ready access
to public records in the custody of a public body or its officers
and employees. To achieve that end, the policy statement
makes clear that there is a presumption of openness for all
public records, and that records may only be withheld if a
exemption is invoked: Unless a public body or its officers
or employees specifically elect to exercise an exemption provided
by this chapter or any other statute ... all public records
shall be available for inspection and copying upon request.
All public records ... shall be presumed open, unless an exemption
is properly invoked. Furthermore, FOIA sets forth its
own rule of construction to further the policy of openness,
as follows:
The
provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed
to promote an increased awareness by all persons of governmental
activities and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness
the operations of government. Any exemption from public
access to records... shall be narrowly construed and no
record shall be withheld ... unless specifically made exempt
pursuant to this chapter or other specific provision of
law.
The procedural
portion of FOIA regarding records requests, § 2.2-3704,
implements this policy in subsection A by stating that
[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by law, all public
records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizens
of the Commonwealth during the regular office hours of the
custodian of such records. Subdivisions B 1 and B 2 of
the same section further require that whenever requested records
are withheld in whole or in part, the public body must respond
in writing and cite, as to each category of withheld records,
the specific Code section that authorizes the withholding
of the records. While you did not describe a specific
instance where DOLI denied a particular request, for purposes
of this opinion, it is presumed that DOLI has followed the
proper FOIA procedure, citing § 40.1-11 in writing in
its denial.
Turning
to the substance of your inquiry, the question posed concerns
the scope of § 40.1-11. The statutory authority of this
office is limited to FOIA matters.3 Therefore we only consider
the scope of § 40.1-11 as it relates to FOIA, and do
not offer any independent interpretation of § 40.1-11
as it may operate in other contexts. Research revealed no
controlling opinions from the Supreme Court of Virginia, but
the interaction between § 40.1-11 and FOIA has been addressed
by the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond in Appalachian
Information, Inc. v. Boggs.4
The
Boggs court there took a two-pronged approach to
§ 40.1-11, first examining whether the records at issue
qualified as any information or statistics gathered from
any person, company, or corporation; and second, considering
whether the disclosure was for any purposes other than
those of [Title 40.1]. That case involved a request for
mine inspection reports, which the court found fell within
§ 40.1-11 as information or statistics gathered from
any person, company or corporation. The contention was
raised that the mine inspection reports were created by the
mine inspectors themselves, and therefore were not gathered
from any person, company or corporation. However, the
court opined that
the
information which the mine inspector puts on his report
is certainly information that he has gathered from his investigation
and study at the mine and certainly the information contained
in his report is information gathered from persons and from
the company. The fact that the report is prepared and created
by the mine inspector does not preclude the information
which he puts on his report from being information gathered
from any person, company and corporation. The court so finds
that the information contained on all of the mine inspection
reports described in this case is information gathered from
any person, company or corporation as defined in Section
40.1-11.
The court
then examined the purposes of Title 40.1, as expressed in
§ 40.1-3, finding that its provisions are intended
to provide solely for the safety, health and welfare of employees
and the benefits thereof shall not run to any other person.5
Looking at then § 2.1-340.1 (now § 2.2-3700), the
court found that the purposes of FOIA
were
twofold: On the one hand the act is "to insure to the
people of the Commonwealth ready access to records in the
custody of public officials..." and on the other hand,
the act is to insure "free entry to meetings of public
bodies where the business of the people is being conducted."
The
General Assembly provided further ... that where questions
arise as to the applicability of the act to particular situations,
that the act is to be liberally construed to promote its
application and to be narrowly construed against exception
or exemption from applicability of the act.
Contrasting
the purposes of Title 40.1 and FOIA, and observing that then
§ 2.1-342 (now § 2.2-3704) expressly and explicitly
excludes from its operation records that may be subject to
other specific provisions of law which limit or prohibit the
disclosure of public records, the Boggs court decided
as follows:
The
defendant contends that Section 40.1-11 of the Code ...
is an express statutory prohibition against the release
of information by the defendants to any unauthorized person
or corporation. Therefore, it can be seen that the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act expressly recognizes the fact
that there are other statutory prohibitions against the
release of information and the act specifically provides
for the exclusion of such information from the operation
of the act. The court therefore finds that § 2.1-342
[now subsection A of § 2.2-3704] of the Freedom of
Information Act does provide a statutory prohibition against
the release of information by the defendants to any unauthorized
person or corporation when read in relation to Section 40.1-11
of the Code. A fair reading of these two sections together
make it implicit that the Freedom of Information Act is
not applicable to information or statistics gathered from
any person, company or corporation for any purposes other
than those of Title 40.1 ... of the Code.
While
recognizing that Boggs is not controlling precedent,
we do not find fault with the analysis and reasoning used
by the court therein. Applying the same analysis and reasoning
to the instant matter, it would appear that the VOSH records,
like the mine inspection reports in Boggs, would
qualify as any information or statistics gathered from
any person, company, or corporation under § 40.1-11.
The purposes of FOIA and the purposes of Title 40.1 remain
distinct, as they were when Boggs was decided. Therefore,
following the precedent set by Boggs, it appears
that § 40.1-11 does act to exempt the VOSH records at
issue from mandatory disclosure under FOIA.
Thank
you for contacting this office. I hope that I have been of
assistance.
Sincerely,
Maria
J.K. Everett
Executive Director
1Quoted
from http://www.doli.virginia.gov/vosh_enforcement/vosh_enforcement_intro.html
(last visited August 25, 2011). The website indicates further
that the VOSH program also addresses safety issues concerning
overhead high voltage lines and asbestos.
2In this context, Code § 40.1-2 provides the
following definitions for the terms "Commissioner"
and "Department": "Commissioner" means
the Commissioner of Labor and Industry. Except where the context
clearly indicates the contrary, any reference to "Commissioner"
shall include his authorized representatives. "Department"
means the Department of Labor and Industry.
3See § 30-179 (powers and duties
of the FOIA Council).
49 Va. Cir. 402 (Richmond City 1977); also
see Stevens v. Lemmie, 40 Va. Cir. 499 (Petersburg 1996)(quoting
Boggs). Note that when Boggs was decided,
§ 40.1-11 read as follows: Neither the Commissioner
nor any employee of the Department shall make use of or reveal
any information or statistics gathered from any person, company
or corporation, for any purposes other than those of this
title or of Title 45.1. The reference to Title 45.1 (Mines
and Mining) was subsequently removed, but otherwise the 1977
language is identical to the current law. Although relevant
to the Boggs case, since that case concerned mine
inspection reports, based on the facts you presented it does
not appear that the deletion of the reference to Title 45.1
is pertinent to this advisory opinion.
5Current § 40.1-3 reads as follows:
The provisions of this title are intended to provide solely
for the safety, health and welfare of employees and the benefits
thereof shall not run to any other person nor shall a third
party have any right of action for breach of any provision
of this title except as herein otherwise specifically provided.
Note that the Boggs court also considered the purposes
of Title 45.1 in reaching its decision (see n.4,
supra).
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