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VIRGINIA
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ADVISORY COUNCIL
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
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AO-1-00
September
29, 2000
Mr. Will F. Corbin
Editor, Daily Press
Newport News, VA
The staff of the
Freedom of Information Advisory Council is authorized to issue
advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based
solely upon the information presented in your correspondence,
unless otherwise indicated.
Dear Mr. Corbin:
This will acknowledge
receipt of your letter of August 18, 2000, and the correspondence
between Greg Lohr and Judith Malveaux, also of the Daily Press,
and James E. Barnett, county attorney for the County of York.
You have requested "illumination" on a number of issues related
to the application of the Virginia Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) to emails between members of a public body.
1. Your first question
concerns the definition of the term "transaction of public
business" and whether certain emails to or from public officials
can be considered "personal" when such email messages go
through a government agency’s email database.
Under FOIA, the term
"transaction of public business" is not defined. According
to statutory construction rules, in the absence of a statutory
definition, a statutory term is considered to have its ordinary
meaning, given the context in which it is used.1
FOIA, however, does
define "public records" as all writings and recordings
which consist of letters, words or numbers, or their equivalent,
set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostatting,
photography, magnetic impulse, optical or magneto-optical
form, mechanical or electronic recording or other form of
data compilation, however stored, and regardless of physical
form or characteristics, prepared or owned by, or in the possession
of a public body or its officers, employees or agents in
the transaction of public business. (Emphasis added).
In order for a writing or recording to fall within the definition
of "public record," it must be as described in the definition
and be related to the transaction of public business.
Implicit in the definition is that not all writings and recordings,
etc., are public records. Because the definition of "public
records" includes those stored in electronic form, email
messages related to public business are covered by FOIA.
Based on the foregoing,
it would appear that emails between members of a public body
that are not related to the transaction of public business
are not "public records" under FOIA and therefore are not
subject to its mandatory disclosure requirements. The fact
that email messages go through a government agency’s email
database does not, by itself, make them public records. It
is also the subject of those emails that determines
their status as public records.
I note parenthetically
that the Library of Virginia has had to grapple with the question
of what constitutes records related to the transaction of
public business in the context of the Virginia Public Records
Act (§ 42.1-76 et seq.). Although the primary purpose of this
Act is to set standards for the retention of public
records, the guidelines established by the Library of Virginia
pursuant to the Virginia Public Records Act distinguish between
emails that are public records (and hence subject to retention)
and those that are not. Examples of "non-records" include
personal messages or announcements, convenience or reference
copies, phone message reminders, routine chat on email listservers,
and announcements of social events. You may obtain further
information on this issue by contacting the Records Management
and Imaging Services Division of the Library of Virginia.
2. Your second question
is whether, under FOIA, an email transmitted through a government
computer database is different in any way from a paper letter
on government stationery.
The substance of
my response to your previous question concerning email messages
and government databases is applicable to this question. For
your information, the Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory
Council is currently examining the nature of email and other
electronic communication in the context of FOIA’s open records
and meeting requirements.
3. Your third question
contains two parts: first, can a charge of several thousand
dollars for the production of any email from within the previous
two weeks be considered "reasonable"; and second, assuming
that the estimated cost is accurate, whether a government
entity has an obligation to reduce the cost of producing a
record.
Subsection F of §
2.1-342 of the Code of Virginia provides:
A public body
may make reasonable charges for its actual cost incurred
in accessing, duplicating, supplying, or searching for
the requested records. No public body shall impose any
extraneous, intermediary or surplus fees or expenses to
recoup the general costs associated with creating or maintaining
records or transacting the general business of the public
body. Any duplicating fee charged by a public body shall
not exceed the actual cost of duplication.
FOIA authorizes public
bodies to make reasonable charges for their actual cost for
the production of requested records. Regardless of the public
body involved in the instant case, it appears they have exercised
their statutory prerogative. While I assume that the charge
is the actual cost, the question of whether or not that charge
is reasonable is one for the courts and not this office. As
to the second part of your question, any portion of a charge
ruled to be unreasonable likely would not be permitted.
4. Your fourth question
is whether any communication between a county administrator
or school superintendent and the governing board members is
exempt under the "working papers" exemption authorized under
subdivision A6 of § 2.1-342.01.
The "working papers"
exemption is essentially an executive privilege and extends
to the Office of the Governor; Lieutenant Governor; the Attorney
General; the members of the General Assembly or the Division
of Legislative Services; the mayor or chief executive officer
of any political subdivision of the Commonwealth; or the
president or other chief executive officer of any public institution
of higher education. (Emphasis added) Opinions of the Attorney
General have held that school superintendents are included
in this exemption because local school divisions are separate
political subdivisions for the purposes of FOIA.2
Subdivision A6 of
§ 2.1-342.01 also defines "working papers" as those records
prepared by or for an above-named public official for
his personal or deliberative use. (Emphasis added.)
To the extent that
the communications are prepared for the chief executive officer
for his personal or deliberative use, the "working papers"
exemption may be properly invoked. However, once the communication
is disseminated to members of the governing body, it loses
its exempt status.3 It is important to note, as
stated earlier, that the "working papers" exemption is essentially
an executive privilege and with the exception of the General
Assembly, does not extend to governing bodies.
5. Your fifth question
is whether the cost of legal review of requested materials
may be considered a legitimate part of the cost of producing
the record.
Subsection F of §
2.1-342 of the Code of Virginia provides:
A public body
may make reasonable charges for its actual cost incurred
in accessing, duplicating, supplying, or searching for
the requested records. No public body shall impose any
extraneous, intermediary or surplus fees or expenses to
recoup the general costs associated with creating or maintaining
records or transacting the general business of the public
body. Any duplicating fee charged by a public body shall
not exceed the actual cost of duplication.
Subsection F of §
2.1-342 appears to preclude a charge for the legal review
of requested materials because such a charge would be an intermediary
fee to recoup the general costs associated with transacting
the general business of the public body.
6. Your sixth question
requests helpful guidance on the boundaries of "specific"
as FOIA contemplates it.
From reviewing the
attachments that accompanied your letter, I assume that this
question concerns the requirement that requests for records
made under FOIA identify the requested records with reasonable
specificity. "Reasonable specificity" or "specific" are not
defined terms under FOIA and therefore the statutory construction
rules applied in your first question apply here. Webster’s
New Collegiate Dictionary (1977 Edition) defines "specific"
as constituting or falling into a specifiable category, free
from ambiguity. Common sense would dictate that a request
needs to be specific enough to enable a public body to begin
to process the request and, if clarification is required,
to ask relevant questions to understand the scope of the request.
Section 2.1-340.1 requires all public bodies and public officials
to make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with a requester
concerning the production of the records requested. This provision
presumes that
the parties will talk to one another to facilitate the production
of the requested records in a manner satisfactory to the parties.
7. Your final question
asks for a comment on the appropriateness of a citizen using
FOIA to gain routine access to the correspondence of members
of a governing body.
Generally, FOIA provides
a right of access to public records. The motive for the request
is immaterial. Strictly speaking, your question is not one
about the application of FOIA. The issue of the appropriateness
of a request is not one for this office.
Thank you for contacting
this office. I hope that I have been of assistance.
Sincerely,
Maria J. K. Everett
Executive Director
1Commonwealth Department of Taxation v. Orange-Madison
Coop. Farm Service, 220 VA 655, 261 S.E. 2d 532 (1980), 1991
Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 140, 1988 Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 413, 1986-1987
Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 174; see generally Norman J. Singer, Statutes
and Statutory Construction, 6th ed., §46:01.
21976-77 Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 318.
31982-82
Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 724 and 1975-76 Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 415.
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